doc: warn about MD5 keys not protecting extension fields
Add a warning to the chrony.conf man page that MD5 keys cannot protect NTP extension fields due to the length extension attack.
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@ -2821,7 +2821,11 @@ source is specified in the configuration file with a key shorter than 80 bits.
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The recommended key types are AES ciphers and SHA3 hash functions. MD5 should
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be avoided unless no other type is supported on the server and client, or
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peers.
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peers. A major weakness of MD5 for the NTP MAC is a length extension attack,
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where a man-in-the-middle attacker can add arbitrary extension fields to the
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NTP message and update the MAC to pass the verification of the extended
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message. The *extfield* option (enabling processing of the specified extension
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field) should not be used for NTP sources authenticated with an MD5 key.
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The <<chronyc.adoc#keygen,*keygen*>> command of *chronyc* can be used to
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generate random keys for the key file. By default, it generates 160-bit MD5 or
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