Merge branch '1.29-security'
This commit is contained in:
commit
dc8a46363f
7 changed files with 239 additions and 62 deletions
8
NEWS
8
NEWS
|
@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
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|||
New in version 1.29.1
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||||
=====================
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||||
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||||
Security fixes
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||||
--------------
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||||
* Modify chronyc protocol to prevent amplification attacks (CVE-2014-0021)
|
||||
(incompatible with previous protocol version, chronyc supports both)
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||||
|
||||
New in version 1.29
|
||||
===================
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
33
candm.h
33
candm.h
|
@ -360,13 +360,24 @@ typedef struct {
|
|||
Version 5 : auth data moved to the end of the packet to allow hashes with
|
||||
different sizes, extended sources, tracking and activity reports, dropped
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||||
subnets accessed and client accesses
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||||
|
||||
Version 6 : added padding to requests to prevent amplification attack,
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changed maximum number of samples in manual list to 16
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*/
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||||
#define PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER 5
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#define PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER 6
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||||
|
||||
/* The oldest protocol version that is compatible enough with
|
||||
the current version to report a version mismatch */
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#define PROTO_VERSION_MISMATCH_COMPAT 4
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||||
/* The oldest protocol versions that are compatible enough with the current
|
||||
version to report a version mismatch for the server and the client */
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#define PROTO_VERSION_MISMATCH_COMPAT_SERVER 5
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#define PROTO_VERSION_MISMATCH_COMPAT_CLIENT 4
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/* The first protocol version using padding in requests */
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#define PROTO_VERSION_PADDING 6
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/* The maximum length of padding in request packet, currently
|
||||
defined by CLIENT_ACCESSES_BY_INDEX and MANUAL_LIST */
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#define MAX_PADDING_LENGTH 396
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||||
/* ================================================== */
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||||
|
@ -424,8 +435,13 @@ typedef struct {
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|||
REQ_ReselectDistance reselect_distance;
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} data; /* Command specific parameters */
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||||
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||||
/* authentication of the packet, there is no hole after the actual data
|
||||
from the data union, this field only sets the maximum auth size */
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/* The following fields only set the maximum size of the packet.
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There are no holes between them and the actual data. */
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/* Padding used to prevent traffic amplification */
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uint8_t padding[MAX_PADDING_LENGTH];
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||||
|
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/* Authentication data */
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uint8_t auth[MAX_HASH_LENGTH];
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|
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} CMD_Request;
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|
@ -465,6 +481,7 @@ typedef struct {
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|||
#define STT_BADSUBNET 7
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#define STT_ACCESSALLOWED 8
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#define STT_ACCESSDENIED 9
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/* Deprecated */
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#define STT_NOHOSTACCESS 10
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#define STT_SOURCEALREADYKNOWN 11
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#define STT_TOOMANYSOURCES 12
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|
@ -585,9 +602,10 @@ typedef struct {
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|||
uint32_t next_index; /* the index 1 beyond those processed on this call */
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uint32_t n_clients; /* the number of valid entries in the following array */
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RPY_ClientAccesses_Client clients[MAX_CLIENT_ACCESSES];
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int32_t EOR;
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} RPY_ClientAccessesByIndex;
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|
||||
#define MAX_MANUAL_LIST_SAMPLES 32
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#define MAX_MANUAL_LIST_SAMPLES 16
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typedef struct {
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Timeval when;
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|
@ -599,6 +617,7 @@ typedef struct {
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|||
typedef struct {
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uint32_t n_samples;
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RPY_ManualListSample samples[MAX_MANUAL_LIST_SAMPLES];
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int32_t EOR;
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} RPY_ManualList;
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|
||||
typedef struct {
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||||
|
|
31
client.c
31
client.c
|
@ -1239,6 +1239,7 @@ static unsigned long token = 0;
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|
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static int max_retries = 2;
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static int initial_timeout = 1000;
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static int proto_version = PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER;
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|
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/* This is the core protocol module. Complete particular fields in
|
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the outgoing packet, send it, wait for a response, handle retries,
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|
@ -1257,13 +1258,13 @@ submit_request(CMD_Request *request, CMD_Reply *reply, int *reply_auth_ok)
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int read_length;
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int expected_length;
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int command_length;
|
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int padding_length;
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int auth_length;
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struct timeval tv;
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int timeout;
|
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int n_attempts;
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fd_set rdfd, wrfd, exfd;
|
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request->version = PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER;
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request->pkt_type = PKT_TYPE_CMD_REQUEST;
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request->res1 = 0;
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request->res2 = 0;
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|
@ -1278,6 +1279,14 @@ submit_request(CMD_Request *request, CMD_Reply *reply, int *reply_auth_ok)
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n_attempts = 0;
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do {
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request->version = proto_version;
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command_length = PKL_CommandLength(request);
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padding_length = PKL_CommandPaddingLength(request);
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assert(command_length > 0 && command_length > padding_length);
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|
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/* Zero the padding to avoid sending uninitialized data. This needs to be
|
||||
done before generating auth data as it includes the padding. */
|
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memset(((char *)request) + command_length - padding_length, 0, padding_length);
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|
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/* Decide whether to authenticate */
|
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if (password) {
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|
@ -1291,9 +1300,6 @@ submit_request(CMD_Request *request, CMD_Reply *reply, int *reply_auth_ok)
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auth_length = 0;
|
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}
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|
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command_length = PKL_CommandLength(request);
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assert(command_length > 0);
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|
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/* add empty MD5 auth so older servers will not drop the request
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due to bad length */
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if (!auth_length) {
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|
@ -1400,8 +1406,8 @@ submit_request(CMD_Request *request, CMD_Reply *reply, int *reply_auth_ok)
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continue;
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}
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bad_header = ((reply->version != PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER &&
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!(reply->version >= PROTO_VERSION_MISMATCH_COMPAT &&
|
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bad_header = ((reply->version != proto_version &&
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||||
!(reply->version >= PROTO_VERSION_MISMATCH_COMPAT_CLIENT &&
|
||||
ntohs(reply->status) == STT_BADPKTVERSION)) ||
|
||||
(reply->pkt_type != PKT_TYPE_CMD_REPLY) ||
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(reply->res1 != 0) ||
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|
@ -1416,6 +1422,19 @@ submit_request(CMD_Request *request, CMD_Reply *reply, int *reply_auth_ok)
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continue;
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}
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|
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#if PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER == 6
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/* Protocol version 5 is similar to 6 except there is no padding.
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If a version 5 reply with STT_BADPKTVERSION is received,
|
||||
switch our version and try again. */
|
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if (proto_version == PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER &&
|
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reply->version == PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER - 1) {
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||||
proto_version = PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER - 1;
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continue;
|
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}
|
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#else
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||||
#error unknown compatibility with PROTO_VERSION - 1
|
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#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Good packet received, print out results */
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
printf("Reply cmd=%d reply=%d stat=%d seq=%d utok=%08lx tok=%d\n",
|
||||
|
|
63
cmdmon.c
63
cmdmon.c
|
@ -265,11 +265,25 @@ prepare_socket(int family)
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|||
void
|
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CAM_Initialise(int family)
|
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{
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
assert(!initialised);
|
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initialised = 1;
|
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|
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assert(sizeof (permissions) / sizeof (permissions[0]) == N_REQUEST_TYPES);
|
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|
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for (i = 0; i < N_REQUEST_TYPES; i++) {
|
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CMD_Request r;
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int command_length, padding_length;
|
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|
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r.version = PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER;
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r.command = htons(i);
|
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command_length = PKL_CommandLength(&r);
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padding_length = PKL_CommandPaddingLength(&r);
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assert(padding_length <= MAX_PADDING_LENGTH && padding_length <= command_length);
|
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assert(command_length == 0 || command_length >= offsetof(CMD_Reply, data));
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}
|
||||
|
||||
utoken = (unsigned long) time(NULL);
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|
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issued_tokens = returned_tokens = issue_pointer = 0;
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||||
|
@ -1708,7 +1722,13 @@ read_from_cmd_socket(void *anything)
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assert(0);
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||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
allowed = ADF_IsAllowed(access_auth_table, &remote_ip) || localhost;
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||||
if (!(localhost || ADF_IsAllowed(access_auth_table, &remote_ip))) {
|
||||
/* The client is not allowed access, so don't waste any more time
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||||
on him. Note that localhost is always allowed access
|
||||
regardless of the defined access rules - otherwise, we could
|
||||
shut ourselves out completely! */
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||||
return;
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||||
}
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||||
|
||||
/* Message size sanity check */
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if (read_length >= offsetof(CMD_Request, data)) {
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||||
|
@ -1718,13 +1738,13 @@ read_from_cmd_socket(void *anything)
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}
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|
||||
if (expected_length < offsetof(CMD_Request, data) ||
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read_length < offsetof(CMD_Reply, data) ||
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rx_message.pkt_type != PKT_TYPE_CMD_REQUEST ||
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rx_message.res1 != 0 ||
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rx_message.res2 != 0) {
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|
||||
/* We don't know how to process anything like this */
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if (allowed)
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CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
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CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
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||||
return;
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}
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|
@ -1752,15 +1772,12 @@ read_from_cmd_socket(void *anything)
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if (!LOG_RateLimited()) {
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LOG(LOGS_WARN, LOGF_CmdMon, "Read command packet with protocol version %d (expected %d) from %s:%hu", rx_message.version, PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER, UTI_IPToString(&remote_ip), remote_port);
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}
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if (allowed)
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CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
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if (rx_message.version >= PROTO_VERSION_MISMATCH_COMPAT) {
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CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
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|
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if (rx_message.version >= PROTO_VERSION_MISMATCH_COMPAT_SERVER) {
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tx_message.status = htons(STT_BADPKTVERSION);
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/* add empty MD5 auth so older clients will not drop
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the reply due to bad length */
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memset(((char *)&tx_message) + PKL_ReplyLength(&tx_message), 0, 16);
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transmit_reply(&tx_message, &where_from, 16);
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transmit_reply(&tx_message, &where_from, 0);
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}
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return;
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}
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|
@ -1769,8 +1786,8 @@ read_from_cmd_socket(void *anything)
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if (!LOG_RateLimited()) {
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LOG(LOGS_WARN, LOGF_CmdMon, "Read command packet with invalid command %d from %s:%hu", rx_command, UTI_IPToString(&remote_ip), remote_port);
|
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}
|
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if (allowed)
|
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CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
|
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|
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CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
|
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|
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tx_message.status = htons(STT_INVALID);
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transmit_reply(&tx_message, &where_from, 0);
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|
@ -1781,32 +1798,14 @@ read_from_cmd_socket(void *anything)
|
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if (!LOG_RateLimited()) {
|
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LOG(LOGS_WARN, LOGF_CmdMon, "Read incorrectly sized command packet from %s:%hu", UTI_IPToString(&remote_ip), remote_port);
|
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}
|
||||
if (allowed)
|
||||
CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
|
||||
|
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CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
|
||||
|
||||
tx_message.status = htons(STT_BADPKTLENGTH);
|
||||
transmit_reply(&tx_message, &where_from, 0);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!allowed) {
|
||||
/* The client is not allowed access, so don't waste any more time
|
||||
on him. Note that localhost is always allowed access
|
||||
regardless of the defined access rules - otherwise, we could
|
||||
shut ourselves out completely! */
|
||||
|
||||
if (!LOG_RateLimited()) {
|
||||
LOG(LOGS_WARN, LOGF_CmdMon, "Command packet received from unauthorised host %s port %d",
|
||||
UTI_IPToString(&remote_ip),
|
||||
remote_port);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tx_message.status = htons(STT_NOHOSTACCESS);
|
||||
transmit_reply(&tx_message, &where_from, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* OK, we have a valid message. Now dispatch on message type and process it. */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Do authentication stuff and command tokens here. Well-behaved
|
||||
|
|
17
faq.txt
17
faq.txt
|
@ -153,23 +153,10 @@ arise. You should always make X quite high (e.g. 10) in this directive.
|
|||
|
||||
S: Issues with chronyc
|
||||
|
||||
Q: I keep getting the error '510 No command access from this host --- Reply not authenticated'.
|
||||
Q: I keep getting the error '506 Cannot talk to daemon'.
|
||||
Make sure that the chrony.conf file (on the computer where chronyd is running)
|
||||
has a 'cmdallow' entry for the computer you are running chronyc on. This
|
||||
shouldn't be necessary for localhost, but some people still seem to need an
|
||||
entry like 'cmdallow 127.0.0.1'. (It would be good to understand why problem
|
||||
only affects some people).
|
||||
|
||||
Q: I cannot log in from chronyc to carry out privileged tasks.
|
||||
This is the second most common problem.
|
||||
|
||||
Perhaps your /etc/chrony.keys file is badly formatted. Make sure that the
|
||||
final line has a line feed at the end, otherwise the key on that line will work
|
||||
as though the last character is missing. (Note, this bug was fixed in version
|
||||
1.16.)
|
||||
|
||||
Q: When I enter a command and hit <Return>, chronyc hangs
|
||||
This probably means that chronyc cannot communicate with chronyd.
|
||||
isn't necessary for localhost.
|
||||
|
||||
Perhaps chronyd is not running. Try using the ps command (e.g. on Linux, 'ps
|
||||
-auxw') to see if it's running. Or try 'netstat -a' and see if the ports
|
||||
|
|
147
pktlength.c
147
pktlength.c
|
@ -35,8 +35,8 @@
|
|||
|
||||
/* ================================================== */
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
PKL_CommandLength(CMD_Request *r)
|
||||
static int
|
||||
command_unpadded_length(CMD_Request *r)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int type;
|
||||
type = ntohs(r->command);
|
||||
|
@ -157,6 +157,149 @@ PKL_CommandLength(CMD_Request *r)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* ================================================== */
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
PKL_CommandLength(CMD_Request *r)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int command_length;
|
||||
|
||||
command_length = command_unpadded_length(r);
|
||||
if (!command_length)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
return command_length + PKL_CommandPaddingLength(r);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ================================================== */
|
||||
|
||||
#define PADDING_LENGTH_(request_length, reply_length) \
|
||||
((request_length) < (reply_length) ? (reply_length) - (request_length) : 0)
|
||||
|
||||
#define PADDING_LENGTH(request_data, reply_data) \
|
||||
PADDING_LENGTH_(offsetof(CMD_Request, request_data), offsetof(CMD_Reply, reply_data))
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
PKL_CommandPaddingLength(CMD_Request *r)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int type;
|
||||
|
||||
if (r->version < PROTO_VERSION_PADDING)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
type = ntohs(r->command);
|
||||
|
||||
if (type < 0 || type >= N_REQUEST_TYPES)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
switch (type) {
|
||||
case REQ_NULL:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_ONLINE:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.online.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_OFFLINE:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.offline.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_BURST:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.burst.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MODIFY_MINPOLL:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.modify_minpoll.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MODIFY_MAXPOLL:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.modify_maxpoll.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_DUMP:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.dump.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MODIFY_MAXDELAY:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.modify_maxdelay.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MODIFY_MAXDELAYRATIO:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.modify_maxdelayratio.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MODIFY_MAXDELAYDEVRATIO:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.modify_maxdelaydevratio.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MODIFY_MAXUPDATESKEW:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.modify_maxupdateskew.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_LOGON:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.logon.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_SETTIME:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.settime.EOR, data.manual_timestamp.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_LOCAL:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.local.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MANUAL:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.manual.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_N_SOURCES:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.n_sources.EOR, data.n_sources.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_SOURCE_DATA:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.source_data.EOR, data.source_data.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_REKEY:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.rekey.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_ALLOW:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.allow_deny.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_ALLOWALL:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.allow_deny.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_DENY:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.allow_deny.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_DENYALL:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.allow_deny.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_CMDALLOW:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.allow_deny.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_CMDALLOWALL:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.allow_deny.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_CMDDENY:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.allow_deny.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_CMDDENYALL:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.allow_deny.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_ACCHECK:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.ac_check.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_CMDACCHECK:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.ac_check.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_ADD_SERVER:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.ntp_source.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_ADD_PEER:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.ntp_source.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_DEL_SOURCE:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.del_source.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_WRITERTC:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.writertc.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_DFREQ:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.dfreq.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_DOFFSET:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.doffset.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_TRACKING:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.tracking.EOR, data.tracking.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_SOURCESTATS:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.sourcestats.EOR, data.sourcestats.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_RTCREPORT:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.rtcreport.EOR, data.rtc.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_TRIMRTC:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.trimrtc.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_CYCLELOGS:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.cyclelogs.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_SUBNETS_ACCESSED:
|
||||
case REQ_CLIENT_ACCESSES:
|
||||
/* No longer supported */
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
case REQ_CLIENT_ACCESSES_BY_INDEX:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.client_accesses_by_index.EOR, data.client_accesses_by_index.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MANUAL_LIST:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.manual_list.EOR, data.manual_list.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MANUAL_DELETE:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.manual_delete.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MAKESTEP:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.make_step.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_ACTIVITY:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.activity.EOR, data.activity.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_RESELECT:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.reselect.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_RESELECTDISTANCE:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.reselect_distance.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MODIFY_MINSTRATUM:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.modify_minstratum.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
case REQ_MODIFY_POLLTARGET:
|
||||
return PADDING_LENGTH(data.modify_polltarget.EOR, data.null.EOR);
|
||||
default:
|
||||
/* If we fall through the switch, it most likely means we've forgotten to implement a new case */
|
||||
assert(0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* ================================================== */
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
|
|||
|
||||
extern int PKL_CommandLength(CMD_Request *r);
|
||||
|
||||
extern int PKL_CommandPaddingLength(CMD_Request *r);
|
||||
|
||||
extern int PKL_ReplyLength(CMD_Reply *r);
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* GOT_PKTLENGTH_H */
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue