ntp: optimize MAC truncation

When generating a MAC for an NTP packet, request only the bytes that
will be sent.
This commit is contained in:
Miroslav Lichvar 2018-08-27 17:20:56 +02:00
parent 6ab2ed0da6
commit f5206db9b0

View file

@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ transmit_packet(NTP_Mode my_mode, /* The mode this machine wants to be */
)
{
NTP_Packet message;
int auth_len, mac_len, length, ret, precision;
int auth_len, max_auth_len, length, ret, precision;
struct timespec local_receive, local_transmit;
double smooth_offset, local_transmit_err;
NTP_int64 ts_fuzz;
@ -1082,24 +1082,21 @@ transmit_packet(NTP_Mode my_mode, /* The mode this machine wants to be */
&message.transmit_ts, &ts_fuzz);
if (auth_mode == AUTH_SYMMETRIC) {
/* Truncate long MACs in NTPv4 packets to allow deterministic parsing
of extension fields (RFC 7822) */
max_auth_len = version == 4 ?
NTP_MAX_V4_MAC_LENGTH - 4 : sizeof (message.auth_data);
auth_len = KEY_GenerateAuth(key_id, (unsigned char *) &message,
offsetof(NTP_Packet, auth_keyid),
(unsigned char *)&message.auth_data,
sizeof (message.auth_data));
(unsigned char *)&message.auth_data, max_auth_len);
if (!auth_len) {
DEBUG_LOG("Could not generate auth data with key %"PRIu32, key_id);
return 0;
}
message.auth_keyid = htonl(key_id);
mac_len = sizeof (message.auth_keyid) + auth_len;
/* Truncate MACs in NTPv4 packets to allow deterministic parsing
of extension fields (RFC 7822) */
if (version == 4 && mac_len > NTP_MAX_V4_MAC_LENGTH)
mac_len = NTP_MAX_V4_MAC_LENGTH;
length += mac_len;
length += sizeof (message.auth_keyid) + auth_len;
} else if (auth_mode == AUTH_MSSNTP) {
/* MS-SNTP packets are signed (asynchronously) by ntp_signd */
return NSD_SignAndSendPacket(key_id, &message, where_to, from, length);