This will allow a source to have its address changed due to NTS-KE
server negotiation, which allows the NTS-KE server to have a different
address than the NTP server.
Move most of the authentication-specific code to a new file and
introduce authenticator instances in order to support other
authentication mechanisms (e.g. NTS).
Rework the code to detect the authentication mode and count extension
fields in the first parsing of the packet and store this information in
the new packet info structure.
When sending a response in the server or passive mode, make sure the
response is not longer than the request to prevent amplification
attacks when resposes may contain extension fields (e.g. NTS).
Add a structure for length and other information about received and
transmitted NTP packets to minimize the number of parameters and avoid
repeated parsing of the packet.
Improve the client's test D to compare the stratum, reference ID,
reference timestamp, and root delay from the received packet with its
own reference data in order to prevent it from synchronizing to itself,
e.g. due to a misconfiguration.
Add an option to use the median filter to reduce noise in measurements
before they are accumulated to sourcestats, similarly to reference
clocks. The option specifies how many samples are reduced to a single
sample.
The filter is intended to be used with very short polling intervals in
local networks where it is acceptable to generate a lot of NTP traffic.
When the local polling interval is adjusted between minpoll and maxpoll
to a sub-second value, check if the source is reachable and the minimum
measured delay is 10 milliseconds or less. If it's not, ignore the
maxpoll value and set the interval to 1 second.
This should prevent clients (mis)configured with an extremely short
minpoll/maxpoll from flooding servers on the Internet.
If the polling interval is shorter than 8 seconds, set the burst
interval to the 1/4th of the polling interval instead of the 2-second
constant. This should make the burst option and command useful with
very short polling intervals.
Fix mismatches between the format and sign of variables passed to
printf() or scanf(), which were found in a Frama-C analysis and gcc
using the -Wformat-signedness option.
Instead of counting missing responses, switch to the offline state
immediately when sendmsg() fails.
This makes the option usable with servers and networks that may drop
packets, and the effect will be consistent with the onoffline command.
Allow SRC_MAYBE_ONLINE to be specified for new NTP sources and
connectivity setting to select between SRC_ONLINE and SRC_OFFLINE
according to the result of the connect() system call, i.e. check whether
the client has a route to send its requests.
NTPv1 packets have a reserved field instead of the mode field and the
actual mode is determined from the port numbers. It seems there is still
a large number of clients sending NTPv1 requests with a zero value in
the field (per RFC 1059).
Follow ntpd and respond to the requests with server mode packets.
Clients sending packets in the interleaved mode are supposed to use
a different receive and transmit timestamp in order to reliably detect
the mode of the response. If an interleaved request with the receive
timestamp equal to the transmit timestamp is detected, respond in the
basic mode.
When the burst option is specified in the server/pool directive and the
current poll is longer than the minimum poll, initiate on each poll a
burst with 1 good sample and 2 or 4 total samples according to the
difference between the current and minimum poll.
Compare both receive and transmit timestamps in the NTP test number 1.
This prevents a client from dropping a valid response in the interleaved
mode if it follows a response in the basic mode and the server did not
have a kernel/hardware transmit timestamp, and the random bits of the
two timestamps happen to be the same (chance of 1 in 2^(32-precision)).
Before sending a new packet, check if the receive/transmit timestamp
is not equal to the origin timestamp or the previous receive/transmit
timestamp in order to prevent the packet from being its own valid
response (in the symmetric mode) and invalidate responses to the
previous packet.
This improves protection against replay attacks in the symmetric mode.
Save the local receive and remote transmit timestamp needed for
(re)starting the symmetric protocol when no valid reply was received
separately from the timestamps that are used for synchronization of the
local clock.
This extends the interval in which the local NTP state is (partially)
protected against replay attacks in order to complete a measurement
in the interleaved symmetric mode from [last valid RX, next TX] to
[last TX, next TX], i.e. it should be the same as in the basic mode.
Similarly to the maxdelaydevratio test, include in the maximum delay
dispersion which accumulated in the interval since the last sample.
Also, enable the test for symmetric associations.
Instead of giving NTP-specific data to sourcestats in order to perform
the test, provide a function to get all data needed for the test in
ntp_core. While at it, improve the naming of variables.
If the minimum delay is known (in a static network configuration), it
can replace the measured minimum from the register. This should improve
the stability of corrections for asymmetric jitter, sample weighting and
maxdelay* tests.
This allows transmissions in symmetric mode to be scheduled
independently from client transmissions. This reduces maximum delay
in scheduling when chronyd is configured with a larger number of
servers.
In basic client mode, set the origin and receive timestamp to zero.
This reduces the amount of information useful for fingerprinting and
improves privacy as the origin timestamp allows a passive observer to
track individual NTP clients as they move across networks. (With chrony
clients that assumes the timestamp wasn't reset by the chronyc offline
and online commands.)
This follows recommendations from the current version of IETF draft on
NTP data minimization [1].
The timestamp could be theoretically useful for enhanced rate limiting
which can limit individual clients behind NAT and better deal with DoS
attacks, but no server implementation is known to do that.
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ntp-data-minimization-01
In interleaved client mode, when so many consecutive requests were lost
that the first valid (interleaved) response would be dropped for being
too old, switch to basic mode so the response can be accepted if it
doesn't fail in the other tests.
This reworks commit 16afa8eb50.
